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ABSTRACT
Th e purpose of this article is largely theoretical. It asks what type of perspective 
is needed in order for left  libertarians and anarchists to develop a deeper under-
standing of global warming. Th is way of framing the question builds on a set of 
premises which I will spell out. First, global warming is real. Second, the reality 
of global warming exists independently of our discourse about it. Th ird, global 
warming will have real and dangerous consequences for humans and human society. 
Fourth, we do not have full knowledge about global warming and climate change, 
and we must reach a deeper understanding. Fift h, the urgency of global warming 
demands that we act before we know everything we want to know about it. Sixth, 
human societies have an inherently creative capacity to fi nd solutions to the chal-
lenges posed by global warming. Ethical thinking about global warming cannot, 
therefore, be reduced to the realm of human consciousness, language and discourse; 
global warming forces us to rethink our relationship with nature and our possible 
paths to understanding nature and reality in a theoretically serious manner (in the 
Hegelian sense of the word ‘serious’) – that is, in terms of the unity between theory 
and praxis. 
Keywords: Ecology, global warming, anarchist praxis
INTRODUCTION
Because of its relative ‘newness’, global warming is diff erent from most other 
phenomena that we normally relate to ‘globalisation’. For instance, in reading 
the ‘classics’ of left  libertarianism and social ecology, the near absence of analyses 
of global warming and climate change is striking. Th e work of Murray Bookchin 
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is an exception: he began to deal with the topic in the 1960s (Bookchin, 
1987,1990,1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Marshall, 1994). Nonetheless, anarchist perspec-
tives on nature have had a considerable infl uence on the development of the 
environmental movements over the last decades and they are still felt in environ-
mental movements today. It is therefore pertinent to reconsider the historical 
background and particular experiences that produced those infl uences. Th is is 
particularly important in the light of the confl ict between deep and social ecology 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At one point this confl ict was seen by many as 
threatening to ‘split the whole environmental movement’ (Carter, 1995, p. 328). 
Th inking about the challenge posed by global warming has the potential to be a 
very fruitful exercise. It forces us to re-examine critically the ways in which we think 
about the big questions on a global scale while, at the same time, making us focus 
on the deep and narrow, on how we hermeneutically and collectively make sense 
of, and understand, the nature of which we are a part. It also presents a challenge 
to left  libertarians and anarchists to rethink and develop theoretical perspectives in 
the light of new information about, and knowledge of, phenomena. It is not enough 
for anarchists and left  libertarians to limit themselves merely to subsuming global 
warming and climate change within existing theoretical perspectives. 
I will not attempt here to capture the full meaning of phenomena as multi-
faceted as ‘anarchist’ or ‘left  libertarian’ (Evren, 2011; Franks, 2011). However, if 
terms such as ‘anarchism’ or ‘left  libertarianism’ are to be useful tools for analysis, a 
minimal understanding of what characterises them in relation to, and in contrast to, 
other terms or ‘isms’, is necessary. In that spirit I briefl y outline below some of the 
key elements necessary (but not suffi  cient) for ‘off ering a vision of a potential new 
society’ (McKay, Elkin, Neal, and Boraas, 2010).
1. Decentralised forms of organisation. Th is has a number of components. 
Murray Bookchin, for example, builds on E. E. Schumacher to make an argument 
about scale. However, smallness should not be seen as a suffi  cient condition for 
non-violence and non-repression (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999, p. 59). According to 
Malatesta, ‘the new society should be organised with the direct participation of all 
concerned, from the periphery to the centre …’ (Malatesta quoted in McKay, et al., 
2010). Decentralised forms of organisation go hand in hand with an emphasis on, 
and valuing of, spontaneity and creativity (Bookchin, 1975; McKay, et al., 2010).
2. Praxis and experience over theory. ‘Experience through freedom is the only 
means to arrive at the truth and the best solutions; and there is no freedom if 
there is not the freedom to be wrong’ (Malatesta quoted in McKay, et al., 2010). 
However, prioritising praxis and experience over theory has sometimes led left  liber-
tarians to disregard theoretical refl ection on structure at diff erent levels in theoretical 




analysis (Pritchard, 2010). From a critical realist perspective, structures ‘may consist 
of internally related objects so that their generative mechanisms or powers emerge 
from this combination and cannot be reduced to its individual components’ (Sayer, 
2000, p. 14). Deepening our understanding of natural and social structures matters 
to those concerned with human emancipation. 
In this paper I will argue that Murray Bookchin and social ecology off ers the best 
starting point to think about global warming from a non-anthropocentric left  liber-
tarian perspective. Brian Morris accurately explains Bookchin’s underlying philosophy: 
‘… Murray Bookchin sensed that the social and the natural must be grasped in a new 
unity and that the time had come to integrate an ecological, natural philosophy (social 
ecology) with social philosophy based on freedom and mutual aid (anarchism or liber-
tarian socialism)’ (Morris, 2009). To avoid ecological disaster we must, inter alia, reach 
a ‘new sensibility toward the biosphere’. I will, however, argue that the polemic with 
deep ecology in the late 1980s was a missed opportunity for left  libertarian ecology 
to deepen the understanding of the natural environment, and I therefore propose to 
proceed by revisiting the debate between Arne Næss and Bookchin.
BOOKCHIN’S CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY 
In a keynote speech at the National Green gathering at Amherst, Massachusetts 
in 1987, Murray Bookchin challenged the political perspective of deep ecology as 
‘guilty of a deeply fl awed and potentially dangerous ecological perspective’ (Chase, 
1991, p. 8). Th is rather harsh criticism led to a long and oft en nasty debate between 
proponents of deep and social ecology. Th e term ‘deep ecology’ was fi rst coined by 
the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (A. Næss, 1973) to describe a ‘deeper’ form 
of environmental engagement suitable for a new type of environmental movement. 
Re-reading the deep ecology manifesto today, one notes that the many similari-
ties with social ecology overshadow the diff erences by far. By the 1980s, however, 
the term ‘deep ecology’ had, in the US, increasingly come to be identifi ed with an 
eclectic body of ideas, including ideas from militant wilderness activists such as Ed 
Abbey, Christopher Manes and Dave Foreman. It was presumably against some of 
these American militant wilderness activists that Bookchin intended to direct his 
fi ercest criticism. According to Bookchin, deep ecology was now potentially and 
explicitly anti-social and anti-human (Chase, 1991, p. 10). He characterised some 
of the deep ecologists as ‘barely disguised racists, survivalists, macho Daniel Boones, 
and outright social reactionaries’ (Chase, 1991, p. 11). Dave Foreman was ‘guilty 
of’ a form of ‘crude eco-brutalism’ which made Bookchin compare the deep ecology 
movement to Hitler and the third Reich (Bookchin, 1987).
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According to Bookchin, we need instead ‘a resolute attempt to fully anchor 
ecological dislocations in social dislocations; to challenge the vested corporate and 
political interests we should properly call capitalism; to analyse, explore, and attack 
hierarchy as a reality …’ (Bookchin, 1991a, p. 61). For Bookchin, social hierarchies 
should be seen as the root cause of environmental degradation. 
In the debate Bookchin provoked in the environmental movement in Norway, 
I sided with Bookchin. Th ere were several reasons. Th e fi rst was because he directed 
a necessary critique against reactionary policy proposals made by a few North 
American ecologists oft en associated with the deep ecology movement. Dave 
Foreman, for instance, claimed at the height of the 1983-85 famine, that ‘the worst 
thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid – the best thing would be to just let 
nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve’ (cited in Bookchin, 
1991c, p. 124). Others welcomed the AIDS epidemic as ‘a necessary solution’ to 
population control (cited in Bookchin, 1991b, p. 123). Ed Abbey described the 
United States as a product of Northern European civilisation and warned against 
allowing ‘our’ country to be ‘Latinised’ (cited in Bookchin, 1991b, p. 123). My 
second reason was that I felt that the resolution of many of the mainly local issues 
of the 1980s and 1990s depended on the adoption of a social ecologist perspec-
tive on social hierarchies, domination and capitalist exploitation. I did not see how 
‘deep’ ecology could help fi nd ‘deeper’ or better answers to those problems. I now 
believe, in fact, that at the time deep ecology in the US had already degenerated into 
a fragmented and oft en reactionary body of thinking, far removed from the vision 
presented by Næss and others only a few years earlier.
Th e Zapatista uprising in Chiapas further convinced me of the necessity of 
searching for social roots to environmental degradation (Krøvel, 2006, 2009, 2010, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). In Chiapas, the establishment of a nature reserve in 
Montes Azules by the Mexican government, based on a romantic and false vision 
of a special relationship between one indigenous group, ‘the Lacandon’, and the 
rainforest, excluding other indigenous groups deemed ‘less worthy’, provoked a war 
which rendered it virtually impossible to fi nd sustainable solutions to the environ-
mental degradation (de Vos, 2002, 2003). Without social justice, there was no hope 
of resolving very real and serious ecological problems of the Lacandon. Th ere were 
strong similarities between the Zapatista message and social ecology: non-hierar-
chical forms of organisation, anti-capitalism, participation, dialogue and consensus 
must be key in the struggle for human emancipation and environmental justice. 
Yet Næss also raised some concerns about Bookchin’s critique and, in particular, 
the issue of mono-causality: is there one cause of the problem? Bookchin did not 
believe that environmental degradation had only one cause, of course, but he repeat-




edly singled out social hierarchies as the root cause. As Næss argued, in the real 
world, in open systems, there will always be many generative mechanisms causing 
the phenomena we are trying to observe and understand (Bhaskar, 2008; Ugarriza, 
et al., 2009). It was diffi  cult, moreover, to know that something is a root cause. How 
can we know that environmental degradation will end if we remove social hierar-
chies? Understanding Næss’s concerns and the approach to knowledge that informs 
them, off ers a diff erent perspective on Bookchin’s critique and opens up a space for a 
synthesis of social and deep ecology. 
NÆSS AND DEEP ECOLOGY
Murray Bookchin was not alone in worrying about the supposed spiritual 
‘Eco-la-la’ of deep ecology (Bookchin, 1997, p. 47). Other critics raised a number 
of similar concerns. It is, however, necessary to distinguish clearly between Næss 
and much of what has come to be known as ‘deep ecology’ in North America, as for 
instance Joel Kovel does in Th e Enemy of Nature (Kovel, 2007). Here, Kovel quotes 
Næss’s view that ‘it is still clear that some of the most valuable workers for ecolog-
ical goals come from the socialist camp’ (Kovel, 2007, p. 190). Very few people 
infl uenced by deep ecology in North America, Kovel adds, ‘bother to reed Næss’ 
(Kovel, 2007). Most critical analysts of deep ecology spend little time researching in 
detail the historical development of the deep ecology promoted by Næss and how it 
might diff er from the versions rightfully criticised by Bookchin, Foster and others. 
In what follows I will therefore briefl y discuss some of the key concerns raised by 
critics of deep ecology. 
Some of Næss’s earliest work of could create suspicions of anti-rationalism 
if read only casually. Th e infl uence of Henry Bergson was, for instance, visible in 
Næss’s master’s thesis (Norsk biografi sk leksikon, 2011; A. Næss, 1933). Bergson 
had argued that immediate experience and intuition are more signifi cant than 
rationalism and science for understanding reality. Næss’s doctoral thesis, however, 
was primarily infl uenced by the logical positivism of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand 
Russell and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle who, in the 1920s and 1930s, 
combined empiricism with a version of rationalism (see, for example, Næss’s PhD 
thesis: A Næss, 1936). Later work, such as Interpretation and Preciseness (A. D. E. 
Næss, 1953) and Logikk og metodelære: En innføring [Introduction to logics and 
methodology] (A. Næss, 1966) further militate against anti-rationalist readings of 
Næss’s work. 
Another criticism of deep ecology is related to the employment of the term 
‘holism’. According to Foster, Clark and York, the ecological holism oft en found 
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in deep ecology can be traced back to the South African, Jan Christian Smuts 
(Foster, Clark, and York, 2010). Th ey rightfully expose Smuts’s ideas on nature 
and society as among the philosophical underpinnings of the South African racist 
apartheid regime, and demonstrate the ‘enormous’ infl uence of his ecological holism 
throughout academia (Foster, et al., p. 323). Alfred Adler, for instance, promoted 
Smuts’s ecological holism and psychological connections in Vienna at the time that 
Næss studied in the city (early 1930s). ‘Deep ecology carried forward many of the 
essentialistic, vitalistic, and organismic traditions of the idealist side of the ecological 
debate’, say Foster et al. (Foster, et al., 2010, p. 338). Næss and deep ecology is thus 
implicitly linked to essentialistic idealism and racist apartheid politics.
Th e critique of Smuts and his legacy in the ecological movement is important 
and valuable. Th e brief treatment of Næss and deep ecology in this context, however, 
leaves out important aspects of the history. It is indeed possible that Næss, then in 
his early 20s, was exposed to ecological holism in Vienna, but of course not all those 
who attended lectures by Adler or others belonging to the Vienna circle became 
essentialistic idealists or racists. Th is was certainly not the case with Næss. Reducing 
the understanding of holism, and in particular the infl uence of holism on the deep 
ecology promoted by Næss, to Smuts and a handful of South African ecologists, 
would be unfair. Indeed, Scott Randall, Nina Witoszek and others have traced 
the roots of Norwegian ecophilosophy to Niels Treschow (1751-1833), the fi rst 
Norwegian academic philosopher, and to a range of nineteenth-century Norwegian 
writers and poets (Randall, 2007; Witoszek, 1998). According to Randall, Treschow 
‘developed original ideas of holism incorporated with individualism while refl ecting 
upon the natural environment and striving for a type of self-realisation’ (Randall, 
2007, p. 25). While one of Smuts’s followers, the grassland ecologist John Phillips, 
argued, for instance, that indigenous peoples ‘should not be granted any autonomy 
or freedom because it would violate the relations of races within the community’ 
(quoted in Foster, et al., 2010, p. 323), Næss was already resolute about the need for 
local autonomy and decentralisation in 1972, when he made his original call for a 
‘deep ecology’ (A. Næss, 1999b). He pointed out that the existence of ‘exploitation 
and suppression’ was a reality and that it called for ‘extreme caution toward any 
overall plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening classless 
diversity’ (A. Næss, 1999b, p. 4). 
A similar problem arises with Foster et al’s treatment of scepticism in the 
ecological movement, which they link mainly to idealism and extreme construc-
tivism. Th is might be the case for some deep ecologists internationally, but it 
would certainly be a misleading description of the Nordic tradition (Bhaskar, 
Høyer, and Næss, 2012). Of course Næss, in contrast, was not driven by extreme 




constructionism or postmodernism, but he was nevertheless deeply sceptical about 
strong knowledge-claims and the ability of humans to administer nature in its full 
complexity. Instead, he favoured more sensitivity towards ‘our state of ignorance’ (A. 
Næss, 1999b, pp. 4, 5).
Another discussion arose from within Nordic deep ecology itself, between Næss 
and younger activists and scholars infl uenced by Marxism. Sigmund Kvaløy, a former 
student of Næss, for example, highlights the need to focus on human society before 
nature: ‘… although it is important to have strong feelings about nature, we have 
to concentrate on the human society and the human being, otherwise everything 
we cherish will be destroyed. We have so little time’ (Reed and Rothenberg, 1993, 
p. 148). Th e disagreement should not be seen as a confl ict between opposites but, 
rather, the slightly diff erent ordering of priorities. In contrast to what is sometimes 
believed about Næss’s neglect of human society, he was, on numerous occasions, 
engaged in cooperation and dialogue with local communities – for instance in 
order to develop sustainable solutions to the tension between the demands of sheep 
farming and protection of a diminishing population of wolves. Some also argue that 
Næss adopted a diff erent view about the role of environmental action to some of 
the younger generation of deep ecologists, including Kvaløy. For Kvaløy ecophi-
losophy is total engagement. Action is the teacher, not a university seminar (Orton, 
2005). Kvaløy, nevertheless, echoes Næss’s activist approach to social change and he 
reinforced the view that the activist does not need a ‘picture of the future society 
because there are a range of possibilities’ (Orton, 2005). Moreover, Næss was no 
stranger to activism. In the 1960s he played a leading role in enacting an absurd and 
funny essay by Jens Bjørneboe, Norway’s leading left  libertarian nineteenth-century 
novelist (‘How Arne Næss and I conquered NATO’, Bjørneboe, 1996). In 1970 he 
quit his post as professor at Oslo University to become an activist, engaging himself 
in environmental actions and civil disobedience in, for instance, Mardøla and Alta. 
In particular, the environmental actions in Alta resulted in a stronger focus on the 
exploitation and suppression of the Sami (indigenous people).
Activism notwithstanding, Næss and many other ecophilosophers continued 
to advocate ‘non-violence’ and to emphasise social harmony. Kvaløy, in contrast, 
argued that the confl ict model of social change should guide environmentalist 
activism: ‘I’m all for polarisation. Th at’s the only way we get deeper discussions’ 
(quoted in Orton, 2005). Næss did not agree and maintained that maximising 
contact with your opponent is a central norm of the Gandhian approach. Kvaløy 
presented a rather diff erent interpretation. According to Kvaløy, Gandhi teaches 
that ‘[m]an’s most important source of insight and wisdom is located in social 
confl ict where central human values are at stake’ (Orton, 2005). Again, the gap 
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between them is, perhaps, not as wide as it looks. Underlining ‘social harmony’ did 
not mean avoiding confl ict and change and should, rather, also be understood in the 
light of Kropotkin’s critique of vulgar social Darwinism. In interviews and lectures 
Næss repeatedly referred to Kropotkin and the concept of mutual aid (see for 
example Eidslott, 1999). In Mutual Aid (Kropotkin, 1987) Kropotkin argued that 
organic and social life were not ‘characterised by laissez-faire competition, confl ict, 
and survival of the fi ttest, but rather by mutuality and symbiosis’ (Morris, 2005). It 
is true that in Communication and Argument Næss recommended showing respect 
for the opponent to make discussions as fruitful and pleasant as possible, and argued 
for a set of rules, including avoiding tendentious irrelevance, quoting, ambiguity, use 
of straw men, statements of fact and tone of presentation (A. Næss, 1981). However, 
being able to represent the opponent’s view fairly is not only an ideal reached out of 
consideration and respect; it requires willingness and the ability to understand the 
opposing arguments. It will thus potentially help to deepen your own understanding 
of the issue and to develop your own argument further. As Orton puts it, his 
concern to respect the opponent sometimes created the impression that there were 
no enemies, only opponents: from a left  wing perspective this approach appeared 
‘simple-minded’ (Orton, 2005). 
Brian Morris’s thought-provoking left  libertarian critique, developed in Ecology 
and Anarchism: Essays and Reviews on Contemporary Th ought (Morris, 1996), 
criticised Næss’s Ecology, Community and Lifestyle for not directly addressing 
social issues, poverty, economic exploitation and state oppression (A. Næss and 
Rothenberg, 1989). According to Morris, Næss’s only answer to the ecological crisis 
was the advocacy of an ‘ecological consciousness’ and the development of ‘fairly 
strong central political institutions’ (A. Næss and Rothenberg, 1989, p. 157). Th is 
led Morris to categorise Næss and deep ecology under the heading ‘reactionary deep 
ecology’ (Morris, 1996, p. 135). Yet in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle Næss disap-
proves of ‘socialist slogans’ (for instance ‘maximise production’, ‘centralisation’ and 
‘high consumption’) and dedicates a chapter to the censure of ‘bureaucracy’ (A. 
Næss and Rothenberg, 1989, pp.157, 159). ‘Roughly speaking’ he argues, ‘supporters 
of the deep ecology movement seem to move more in the direction of nonviolent 
anarchism than towards communism’ (A. Næss and Rothenberg, 1989, p. 156). 
Næss elsewhere explained that he and others in his circle in the 1960s were ‘heavily 
infl uenced by Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution’ (quoted in Clark, 
2010, p. 26). He had become more critical of anarchism aft er observing that many 
traditional communities that approximated to Kropotkin’s communitarian ideal ‘no 
longer took good care of their environments’ (Clark, 2010, p. 26).
While the term ‘reactionary’ does not accurately describes Næss, Morris was 




right to point out that the main problem with the deep ecology promoted by him 
is the reluctance to engage seriously with a critique of capitalism. Næss’s resistance 
to the growing Marxist infl uence within Nordic deep ecology in the 1970s and the 
critique of capitalism it encouraged must, of course, be understood in its particular 
historical context. Marxism in Norway at the time was dominated by two strands: 
one loyally followed Moscow, the other – and at the time intellectually more infl u-
ential – looked to China, Cambodia and Albania for inspiration. Both were united 
in seemingly limitless admiration for authoritarianism and indiff erence to freedom 
and even life: neither had much to off er in terms of respect for nature. Still, the 
failure to engage systematically and vigorously with capitalism as the dominating 
mechanisms behind poverty, exploitation and environmental degradation limited, 
and continues to reduce, the potential of deep ecology to explain and guide attempts 
to fi nd solutions to environmental problems. 
For all its limitations, Næss’s approach continues to off er some important 
insights for understanding global warming. First is that the ethics of deep ecology are 
not based on the presumption that we know and understand the impact of human 
activity on nature, but on the insight that we do not. It calls for caution because we 
have no way of knowing all the long-term consequences of the complex processes 
we set in motion by our actions. Complexity in nature must be protected because 
complexity is necessary for nature to preserve itself, reproduce and develop. Nature’s 
ability to repair damage depends on natural diversity and complexity. To demand 
caution based on the insight that we do not know the long-term consequences of 
human activity is a better starting point for developing ethics suited to dealing with 
global warming than certainty about the possible consequences of human activity.
Further, as the ecofeminist Karen Warren argues, Næss’s concern was not with 
the correct ‘total’ view, but with the personal and political ‘importance of having, 
and negotiating from, ecologically acceptable … total views’ (Warren, 1999, p. 264). 
Warren notes that the critical goal of deep ecology is not sameness, but the ‘solidarity 
achieved by agreement to the values and beliefs expressed through the … platform’ 
(Warren, 1999, p. 264). Th is argument should be read in the light of the critiques 
advanced by women of colour and women from the global South about the univer-
salising tendencies of the women’s movement. Ecosophical pluralism makes sense 
both ethically and epistemologically.
Th e inclusive and respectful scepticism promoted by Næss in the later stage of 
his career can strengthen and supplement materialist environmentalisms. His focus 
on diversity might also make it easier for some Marxist environmentalists to under-
stand minority perspectives, for instance indigenous people’s perspectives that are 
sometimes at variance with ‘left ist’ Latin American presidents. Foster et al. hold up 
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left ist Latin-American presidents Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales as 
exemplars for a ‘rational, scientifi c regulation of the human metabolism with nature’ 
(Foster, et al., 2010, p. 396). While some of the actions undertaken by these presi-
dents are worthy enough, they also provide a useful reminder about the limitations 
to an approach based on ‘rational scientifi c planning’ and competition for political 
power within the state. Some of these problems have become increasingly clear 
since the publication of Th e Ecological Rift . Th ese left -leaning presidents have been 
employing authoritarianism with increasing frequency as they struggle to maintain 
power confronted by various types of organised opposition. Most worrying, perhaps, 
are the armed and deadly confrontations with indigenous groups struggling for 
control over local territories faced with the threat of expanding exploitation of 
natural resources by national or multinational companies.
Næss’s insistence on pluralism in the face of ‘our state of ignorance’, and caution 
towards overall plans, provide an important perspective for a libertarian environ-
mentalist movement which seeks to understand and fully allow for the integration 
of minority and indigenous peoples’ perspectives. Th is should not be taken to mean 
that Næss was some kind of anarchist, as that would be stretching the argument too 
far – he pragmatically saw the social democratic state as a necessary safeguard against 
exploitation by multinational corporations. He also called for stronger international 
institutions, something most left  libertarians would resist (Morris, 1997). 
I will return to the issue of diversity and the ethical implications of uncertainty 
later, but fi rst I need to clarify why a theory of the nature of global warming is a 
necessary prerequisite for a dialogue on ‘climate change justice’. 
WHAT POSSIBLE ACCESS DO WE HAVE TO THE ONTOLOGY OF GLOBAL 
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE?
Global warming is diff erent from most other issues related to ‘globalisation’ which 
can to some extent be observed locally as they develop globally. We see people 
migrating, we observe capital being moved, information being produced and being 
used in a global market. (To get at the forces driving globalisation, however, we must 
engage in some critical refl ection. Th ey are not out there waiting to be observed.) 
Global warming and climate change, however, are diff erent. Th ey are (still) based 
on theoretical insights that should force us to act long before they can be fully expe-
rienced in such a way that we can no longer doubt their existence. Global collective 
action cannot wait for local experience to take place.
Th e urgency of global warming, then, presents us with a new type of challenge, 
one which can only be solved by global collective action borne out of the construc-




tion of a global consciousness about the reality of global warming. But as the 
theoretical insights about global warming gradually grew in the 1990s in such a way 
in that it could no longer be ignored, a parallel process unfortunately took place. 
Th e term ‘global warming’ was gradually substituted by the term ‘climate change’, 
aft er signifi cant lobbying from business interests and right-wing groups, and to the 
delight of the Bush administration, as Lakoff  and others have demonstrated (Lakoff , 
2010). Substituting ‘global warming’ with ‘climate change’ was a dangerous setback. 
I will try to explain why briefl y, as the explanation is relevant and necessary for the 
analysis of the merits of social ecology, and I will use Bhaskar and critical realism as 
an ‘underlabourer’ of science.1 Th is choice of critical realism is not coincidental. I 
will argue that deep ecology has made signifi cant progress over the last two decades, 
inter alia as a result of the cooperation with critical realists. For an understanding 
of how science can be a valuable social activity in order to comprehend and act on 
the challenge of global warming, a distinction between the realms of real, actual and 
empirical is necessary. 
It is a common misunderstanding that our knowledge of ‘global climate 
change’ is the result of the accumulation of local experiences and locally produced 
knowledge of local ‘climate change’; that we move from having insights into local 
experiences of climate change to gradually processing those insights into knowledge 
on a global scale. Unfortunately, we cannot gain insight into the realm of ‘the actual’ 
through observation and experience alone. To believe that would be naïve empiri-
cism (Bhaskar, 2008).2
Instead, it is useful to employ the three domains of the world outlined by 
Bhaskar: the real, the actual, and the empirical. Th e real is the realm of genera-
tive mechanisms that create the fl ux of events that make up the actual. In order to 
understand this perspective, it is useful to think of Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler 
and Isaac Newton and the emerging understanding of the solar system and eventual 
development of a theory of gravitation. To use the emerging understanding of gravi-
tation as an example will make it possible to connect with Arne Næss and his search 
for a deeper non-foundational understanding of natural phenomena. He studied 
Einstein’s theory of relativity in order to grasp the new (at the time) and potentially 
revolutionary ideas emerging from the fi eld of studying the very large things in the 
universe (as, for instance, Einstein) and quantum mechanics (as, for instance, Niels 
Bohr). More recent deep ecologists have increasingly combined Næss’s ontology of 
nature with a critical realist understanding of how science can be a valuable social 
activity. Th is example, therefore, also serves to illustrate key aspects of current 
versions of deep ecology (or ‘ecophilosophy’, as some now prefer to call it).
Tycho Brahe, the Danish astrologist and astronomer, observed planets and 
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stars, carefully describing their trajectories and possible connections with other stars 
that seemed to form patterns. He used his experience and imagination to interpret 
relationships between observed movements and patterns, and his own life world. 
Nonetheless, he could not move from the realm of the empirical to the realm of the 
actual. His experience seemed to tell him that the earth was the centre of the system, 
and that the sun was orbiting around it. His one-time assistant, Johannes Kepler, 
however, understood that this model was wrong and used Brahe’s observations to 
produce a new model, now with the earth orbiting the sun. A new model did not 
in itself move science to the realm of the actual. Isaac Newton helped to produce 
a deeper understanding when he predicted that an invisible force, gravity, must be 
introduced to explain the observed movements. Still, from a critical realist perspec-
tive, everything we say about reality is fallible (but not equally fallible). Albert 
Einstein later demonstrated that Newton’s theory was far from a complete explana-
tion and continued to search for the unifying theory that might explain both the 
very big (that which the theory of relativity deals with), and the very small (the fi eld 
of quantum mechanics). We still do not understand what gravity is. According to 
Næss, that we do not know should lead us to accept the possibility that our assump-
tions and theories about the world are wrong. 
Th e point here, of course, is that not even a very large number of observations 
and other forms of accumulated experience will by itself guarantee a deeper insight 
into the generative mechanisms which can guide us towards the realm of the actual. 
To achieve that, theoretical refl ection on the many possible causes of observed and 
experienced phenomena is needed. Our best option, in my opinion, is again critical 
realism. According to Bhaskar, explanations (theories) are accomplished by a model 
of explanation comprising a four-phase process: ‘resolution of a complex event into 
its components (causal analysis)’; ‘redescription of component causes’; ‘retrodiction 
to possible (antecedent) causes of components via independently validated normic 
statements’; and ‘elimination of alternative possible causes of components’ (Bhaskar, 
2009, p. 72).
Applying the critical realist model of theoretical refl ection to the phenomenon 
of ‘global warming’, we realise that it is a very complex issue, of course, but also 
that we have at our disposal a number of theories on the most prominent genera-
tive mechanisms at play. Understanding the basics of ‘global warming’ certainly 
requires a substantial number of (fallible) ‘natural laws’ or ‘causal laws’ predicting 
a number of causes for global warming and climate change, for instance, but not 
limited to, those related to the infl ow of energy from the sun, refl ection from clouds, 
ice, sea and vegetation, the greenhouse eff ect, and so on. Understanding ‘climate 
change’, however, is immensely more complicated. Any local observation, in order 




to be interpreted correctly, must be understood in relation both to possible changes 
in climate at all neighbouring localities and globally. A theory of global warming 
is therefore a prerequisite for any critical refl ection on locally observed climate 
change. We are much more likely to produce a robust understanding of generative 
mechanisms behind ‘global warming’ than of the much more complex web of causal 
mechanisms behind locally observed ‘climate change’.
Th e theory of ‘global warming’ predicts a phenomenon caused by a number of 
generative mechanisms, and which empirical evidence has later generally found to be 
reasonably robust. ‘Climate change’, in contrast, describes nothing meaningful except 
for the commonsensical notion that the climate is changing. Th e climate might be 
warming at one locality, cooling at another and staying more or less unchanged at a 
third. Th e generative mechanisms behind such a complex state of aff airs are not likely 
to be fully understood before meaningful collective action must be taken to avoid the 
most drastic consequences of global warming. We have moved from relatively robust 
knowledge of one phenomenon (‘global warming’), which could serve as the basis for 
collective action, to an abyss of uncertainty about the meaning of another (‘climate 
change’). No wonder the Bush administration was pleased. 
Th is detour has served to bring me closer to the goal of explaining why global 
warming poses some serious challenges for social ecology. Let me sum up some of 
the arguments so far. First, because of its novelty (a historical perspective) we have 
little previous experience to draw on in order to understand and respond to global 
warming caused by human activity. Second, because the climate is global by nature, 
any meaningful response would have to be global in scope whereas, as I have already 
argued, left  libertarians have so far engaged mainly with decentralised, local or 
regional political organisation. Th ird, because of the long delay (predicted by theory) 
between activities now and corresponding future eff ects on global warming, we 
cannot rely (solely) on individual or collective experience to formulate responses to 
the challenges posed by global warming. Fourth, because of the anthropocentrism 
of much recent anarchist and left  libertarian thinking, existing perspectives are not 
well suited to the analysis of a nature that also exists beyond – and independently 
of – our endeavours to describe and understand it. Th e only path to a deeper under-
standing of the reality of global warming involves theoretical refl ection on the 
generative mechanisms behind it.
THE LIMITATIONS OF ‘EXPERIENCE’
I do not mean to reduce the term ‘experience’ to mean only what we experience 
individually in our daily lives (Goulet, 1998; Griffi  ths and Whitford, 1988) or that 
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only theories that can be falsifi ed by our individual experiences will be accepted. 
We must interpret ‘experience’ widely enough to encompass collective experiences 
with, for instance, science which functions to convince us of the usefulness – or 
even ‘truth’ – of proposed theories. Th eories can be accepted in such a way that they 
function as foundations for collective action which, aft er all, is what is needed to 
mitigate the consequences of global warming, even though we do not individually 
understand or are able to test those consequences. 
To understand what I mean, think of Einstein and the (second) theory of rela-
tivity. Einstein was in his twenties and worked at a patent offi  ce, conducting purely 
theoretical experiments on his own, when he published his fi rst papers on relativity 
in 1905. Later papers elaborated on the fi rst theory of relativity, and predicted that 
light had mass and would be bent as it travelled past an object asserting a gravita-
tional force on it. Needless to say, many were sceptical, and Einstein only rose to 
general fame aft er his theory was tested and the eff ect he predicted was observed in 
May 1919 (Kumar, 2009, pp. 126, 127). Only a very few scientists actually observed 
and studied light bending, of course, but as the results were made public the 
evidence was acknowledged, and the theory became generally accepted ‘knowledge’ 
in much the same way as did Newton’s predicted force (gravity). We do not neces-
sarily need to understand the details of theories, causal explanations or natural laws 
in order to accept them, or to experience them ourselves, to accept them as ‘true’.3
However, it is important for me to underline that I do not consider the capacity 
to produce insights that transcend existing knowledge and commonsensical 
interpretation of experience the exclusive realm of experts and scientists. On the 
contrary, I believe in the universal inherent human potential to develop the capacity 
for refl exivity and transformative action of this kind. 
However, in comparison to the theory of relativity, theories on global warming 
and climate change face additional challenges before they can be generally accepted 
as ‘true’ based on experience. First, because of the complexity involved in under-
standing climate change, any observation at one locality may be linked to a number 
of possible generative mechanisms – in contrast to the bending of light caused by 
gravity. Second, while the theory that predicted light bending could be tested within 
a few years of its formulation, global warming or global climate change is diff erent. 
Some of the proposed natural laws predict that it will take fi ft y to one hundred years 
from the observation of pollution for the consequences for climate to (possibly) be 
observed. Existing theories forecast a long time lag and that we will not be able to 
observe the predicted results until long aft er collective action should have been taken 
in order to mitigate the consequences of global warming.




REVISITING BOOKCHIN’S CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
Th e mutual interest in understanding and taking nature seriously should have 
formed a basis for fruitful dialogue between Næss and social ecology. Th e style of 
Bookchin’s critique, however, angered many environmentalists and helps explain 
why the subsequent ‘debate’ looked more like a shouting match than a dialogue. 
More seriously, the substantive content of Bookchin’s critique failed to confront his 
opponents’ strongest arguments. Bookchin unfortunately ignored Næss’s published 
writings (Clark, 2010, p. 37).Th is lack of engagement with the deep ecology 
proposed by Næss and others continues to impede a mutually benefi cial learning 
experience. 
In fact, as we have seen, Næss was far from insensitive to social aspects of envi-
ronmental issues and social justice. In an exchange of letters with Paul Feyerabend, 
he claimed to be ‘more of an anarchist’ than Feyerabend, although he himself 
preferred the term ‘possibilism’ to ‘anarchism’ (A. Næss, 1999a, p. 71).4 Th ere 
is nothing in Næss’s original vision of deep ecology which proscribes serious 
engagement with the real and important social issues raised by Bookchin, as later 
developments in deep ecology have demonstrated. A more pertinent criticism of 
Næss’s original deep ecology would have focused on the limited critique of capi-
talism as a ‘ecological cancer: a form of barbarism’ (Bookchin, 2007, p. 56) which 
would have brought Bookchin in line with some of Næss’s former students (Setreng, 
1973; Skønberg and Setereng, 1985). Additionally, Bookchin’s vision of a universe 
developing ‘whose most dynamic and creative attribute is its ceaseless capacity for 
self-organisation into increasingly complex forms’ echoes positions already advanced 
by Næss and Kvaløy (Bookchin, 1994, p. 66). Th ere was ample room for a rich 
and mutually benefi cial dialogue between deep and social ecology, an opportunity 
that Bookchin’s critique missed. While there was a later détente between North 
American deep and social ecologists (for instance in the form of a public debate 
between Foreman and Bookchin, and subsequently a co-authored book), Bookchin 
avoided engaging with the more important and more diffi  cult questions raised by 
Næss’s reply to Bookchin’s critique. Taking these questions and issues more seriously 
could have opened social ecology up to some of the perspectives later developed 
by deep ecologists. By failing to read Næss properly, and reducing him to a leader 
of a band of ‘fuzzy-headed’ followers, Bookchin help cement a view that continues 
to plague much left ist engagement with deep ecology and the environmental 
movement.
A number of crucial issues were left  unanswered by Bookchin aft er Næss’s reply. 
First, is it not anthropocentric to claim that social structures can be taken as the 
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root cause of environmental destruction? Laferrière and Stoett argue otherwise and 
classify Bookchin as a non-anthropocentric thinker (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999). 
Bookchin himself was ‘shocked’ to read the ‘unfounded assertion that I believe in 
anthropocentrism’ (Bookchin, 1991c, p. 122). Nonetheless, according to Adams 
it is justifi able to use the term anthropocentric to describe Bookchin’s thinking 
(Adams, 2011, p. 122). I agree with Adams, but my argument is rather diff erent to 
his and turns on the questions that Bookchin leaves unanswered: how do we know 
that humans started harming the environment only aft er societies became stratifi ed 
with social hierarchies? What type of sources and knowledge do we have in order to 
draw such a conclusion? Bookchin cited ‘considerable anthropological evidence’ for 
his understanding (Bookchin, 1990; 1991a, p. 57; 1991b). But what we know from 
archaeology, and from anthropological studies of a few non-hierarchical indigenous 
groups, is hardly suffi  cient to draw absolute conclusions about root causes. Even 
more importantly, as Næss pointed out, there are no strong grounds for believing 
that environmental destruction will disappear if and when we abolish social hier-
archies. Th e question he asked was about how to develop a new sensibility toward 
the biosphere. If capitalism, social hierarchies and other social mechanisms have 
resulted in a damaged or a broken sensibility that leads us to understand nature 
exclusively in relation to its potential utility for humans, this process must be 
undone. Th e undoing of the destruction caused by capitalism to our sensitivity must 
be envisaged as an organic process in which real experience with nature plays a key 
part. According to Morris, Bookchin also advocated spiritual renewal to develop 
humanity’s potential for rationality, foresight and creativity, and the fostering of an 
ecological sensibility. Th is is in fact also a fairly accurate summary of the proposal 
put forward by Næss and is far from the ‘naïve form of biological reductionism’ 
expressed by deep ecologists, according to Bookchin (Bookchin, 2007, p. 28). 
Indeed, most of the proposals advocated by Næss were compatible with the organic 
and processual way of thinking that Bookchin had proposed.
Many deep ecologists have continued the probe for more knowledge and a 
better understanding of the multiplicity of causes related to human society and 
natural degradation. Th e Nordic version of deep ecology, through the work of 
Sigmund Kvaløy, Petter Næss, Arne Johan Vetlesen, Karl Georg Høyer and others, 
continued to develop deep ecology in various directions, cooperating with, and 
seeking inspiration from, critical realists such as Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer and 
Margaret Archer (Bhaskar, 2010, Bhaskar, Næss and Høyer, 2011; Reed and 
Rothenberg, 1993). More recent versions of deep ecology, now more oft en called 
‘ecophilosophy’, have advanced to improve the analysis of causal eff ects related to 
emerging structures. Others have deepened the critique of capitalism. Combining 




these advances with a continued emphasis on the inherent value of diversity, 
ecophilosophy has evolved into a promising perspective for left  libertarian non-
anthropocentric thinking on global warming, and brings this tradition closer to 
the long left  libertarian tradition of metaphysics of nature implicit in the writings 
of many early anarchists beginning with Bakunin, Reclus, and Kropotkin among 
others. In particular, ecophilosophy proposes an ontology of nature and human 
society which refuses to reduce statements about the world to statements about our 
knowledge of the world (epistemological fallacy) – a valuable antidote to extreme 
forms of hermeneutics. 
Th e version of Nordic deep ecology presented here is a simplifi cation. Th ere 
are, of course, also other forms of ecology, sometimes inspired by Næss and Kvaløy. 
From the late 1960s and 1970s onwards, the counterculture produced forms of 
ecology inspired by anthroposophy and theosophy. Many in this tradition would, 
interestingly enough, trace this tradition back to some of the nineteenth century 
Norwegian anarchists such as Ivar Mortensson (Langen, 1951). Th is, though, lies 
outside the scope of this article.
SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND GLOBAL WARMING
Others have already called for a new synthesis of deep and social ecology (Marshall, 
1994). According to Marshall, this should be a ‘libertarian ecology’ (Marshall, 
1994). Nevertheless, ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are not central issues in 
the analyses of either Bookchin or Marshall. ‘Global warming’ is not listed in the 
index of Nature’s Web, An Exploration of Ecological Th inking, published as recently 
as 1994 (Marshall, 1994). Similarly, ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are not 
major issues in Social Ecology aft er Bookchin (Light, 1998). Marshall is more nuanced 
and thoughtful in his analysis of deep ecology than is Bookchin, proposing a ‘liber-
tarian ecology’ built on deep and social ecology (Marshall, 1994). In line with both 
Bookchin and Næss, Marshall sees human destruction as a social phenomenon, but 
he avoids defi ning social hierarchies as the root cause of environmental degradation. 
So how are social ecologists today employing and developing social ecology as a 
philosophy, to respond to global warming and climate change? As I understand it, 
the Institute for Social Ecology ground their argument on global warming in science, 
particularly the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which, 
as we know, is based on theories predicting generative mechanisms and models 
constructed to help us understand the dynamics between them (Tokar, 2008). Th e 
Institute for Social Ecology, however, seems to gravitate towards understanding and 
explaining global warming based on local experience: ‘What gets lost in all these 
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long-term projections, however, are the ways that chaotic global warming is already 
aff ecting people around the world today’ (Tokar, 2008). Tokar rightly notes that 
the consequences of global warming will probably hurt the poor the most. Th ere is 
certainly an aspect of social justice to global warming issues: ‘Most of the world’s 
poor people live in the tropics and subtropics. Th ey are already living in a world of 
increasingly uncertain rainfall, persistent droughts, coastal fl ooding, loss of wetlands 
and fi sheries, and increasingly scarce fresh water supplies’  (Tokar, 2008). Th is 
might turn out to be a very insightful hypothesis for the future consequences of 
global warming but it is not a precise encapsulation of current knowledge on global 
warming and climate change, and such claims of climate change already observable 
in certain localities have met powerful resistance from many scientists, including 
Mike Hulme (Hulme, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). I disagree with Hulme 
when he tries to explain ‘why we disagree about climate change’ by referring to a set 
of Biblical myths defi ning the ways we see and understand it. He is right, however, 
to note that scare headlines and unfounded dramatic claims tend to be counter-
productive. Claims like ‘already living in’, ‘uncertain rainfall’, ‘droughts’, ‘fl ooding’, 
‘scarce fresh water supplies’ and so on will not produce the desired response unless 
they are supported by strong empirical and theoretical evidence.  
Th is might seem like a minor disagreement in relation to the seriousness of 
the problem at stake, but it is worth considering further. Th e theory of global 
warming does not predict a uniformly warmer world. It will probably get warmer 
in some places and cooler in others. In addition, the climate will also fl uctuate 
over time at each individual locality. Variation is the norm. Even though the long-
term tendency at one locality might be warming, it will also probably experience 
periods of cooling. To increase the complexity, several other generative mechanisms 
will also be infl uencing the climate at any given locality which means that claims 
linking periods of warming at one locality to human activity can always be met with 
counter-arguments relating the same phenomenon to other generative mechanisms. 
Furthermore, if we ground our argument on global warming in observed periods 
of warming we must always expect a backlash. Periods of warming will be followed 
by naturally occurring fl uctuations, including periods of cooling. Th ese periods of 
naturally occurring cooling will provide arguments for climate deniers to counter 
attack. In fact, if the theory on global warming is right, variations will be naturally 
occurring, and the number of observed instances of warming will only be slightly 
higher than the number of observed instances of cooling. Only carefully planned 
measurements at a large number of localities over an extended period of time will 
be able to detect, beyond reasonable doubt, that global warming has been observed 
and experienced. Th is line of argument could be repeated for other phenomena 




related to global warming – drought, fl ooding, hurricanes and so on. By grounding 
the argument in supposedly already observable instances of local changes to the 
climate, the Institute for Social Ecology risks falling into the carefully constructed 
trap of the Bush administration. I believe that this is one of the most important 
reasons why it has proved so diffi  cult to organise eff ective global action against 
anthropogenic global warming.
Another problem for social as well as deep ecology is related to the global 
nature of global warming. Meaningful action must be local but still global in scope. 
However, social and deep ecology have both engaged largely with local, communal 
or regional levels of organisation and most other left  libertarian or anarchist thinkers 
have engaged with decentralised forms of decision making where all those suppos-
edly aff ected by an issue would have equal right to participate in the decision-making 
process. In small communes, for instance, the members would normally also engage 
in numerous face-to-face forms of interaction. Th ose potentially aff ected by the 
consequences of global warming, however, encompass all humankind. Th e experi-
ence of organising and engaging in face-to-face forms of interaction on a daily basis 
forms identities, helps construct imagined communities, and facilitates collective 
action based on creativity and spontaneity. Th e way we organise social life contrib-
utes to producing experiences that will aff ect how we value nature and human life. 
Th e challenge of global warming demands that this creative spontaneity is translated 
into global organised action. 
CONCLUSION
I will now leave behind the confl ict between deep and social ecology to indicate 
possible ways to develop a synthesis between the two. I will not pretend to have 
ready-made answers to the challenge posed by global warming, and will only point 
towards a possible path for future development. First, I agree with Marshall that 
a synthesis of deep and social ecology is needed (Marshall, 1996). It has become 
increasingly urgent since the publication of Marshall’s Nature’s Web, especially 
in the light of the emerging knowledge we now have on the challenge posed by 
global warming. Such a synthesis could combine the need for theorising structures, 
including social hierarchies, and generative mechanisms with ecophilosophical 
refl exivity on nature and human potential for developing a new sensitivity towards 
nature, building on recent developments in deep ecology and critical realism 
(Bhaskar, et al., 2011). A starting point could be Vetlesen’s refl ection on ethics, and 
how a new sensitivity towards nature needs to be developed and nurtured through 
real experiences with nature – and also how the potential to be fully sensitive to 
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nature is being circumscribed in modern capitalist societies (Bhaskar, et al., 2011; 
Vetlesen, 2008, 2009, 2010).
According to Hulme, we should ask what ‘climate change’ can do for us 
(Hulme, 2009, p. 326). First, global warming forces us to think globally; all living 
things are connected and depend on each other. Humans and human society cannot 
be considered in isolation from the global environment of which we are a part. 
Second, our limited insight into global warming and climate change is emerging, 
albeit slowly. What we know or believe to know from experience is not likely to be 
enough to prescribe eff ective policy proposals. We need to know more, to maintain 
ontological curiosity and to resist subsuming analysis of new phenomena within the 
framework of existing theories or ideologies. 
I further propose Wright’s defi nition of realism as a potentially fruitful perspec-
tive for our engagement with nature and reality: ‘A way of describing the process of 
“knowing” that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other 
than the knower (hence “realism”), while also acknowledging that the only access we 
have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversa-
tion between the knower and the thing known (hence “critical”)’ (Wright quoted 
in Lynch, 2007, p. 6). Ecophilosophy proposes an alternative ontology of nature and 
reality which can help us along this spiralling path of dialogue and thus help us think 
systematically from a global perspective. A key element in this alternative ontology 
is the intrinsic value of all things and the value of biological diversity. It is crucial for 
nature to be able to respond to the uncertain but likely rapid and dramatic future 
changes to the climate caused by global warming. It provides a bridge from deep 
ecology for anti-authoritarians and left  libertarians who resist capitalist domina-
tion because of, inter alia, its inherent tendency to destroy other forms of social 
organisation and to create social equivalents to biological monocultures notoriously 
vulnerable to rapid changes. 
Returning to my argument in the introduction, then, I still believe that any 
lasting solution to anthropogenic global warming must build on decentralised forms 
of organisation which stimulate spontaneity and creativity, and facilitate active partic-
ipation in order to build a society that is the ‘expression of the creative potentiality of 
humanity’ (Bookchin, 2002). However, praxis and experience are not enough to reach 
a useful understanding of the challenge posed by global warming. Th eoretical insight 
is the only possible path to an understanding of, and response to, global warming in 
time to organise global collective action to mitigate the problem. Th erefore, left  liber-
tarians must resist the temptation to reduce the framing of the problem to ‘already’ 
experienced changes to the local climate. Ecophilosophy of the critical realism variety, 
combined with anti-authoritarian left  libertarianism, presents us with a non-founda-




tionalist understanding of science, one which will make it possible for science to be a 
valuable contributor in the production of knowledge on global warming. 
Much of what I have said about global warming resembles the defi nition of 
‘post-normal science’ (Schneider and Mastrandrea, 2010, p. 17). According to 
Schneider and Mastrandrea, ‘climate change’ can be seen as a ‘post-normal science’ 
because some groups want or need to know ‘the answer well before normal science 
has resolved the deep inherent uncertainties surrounding the problem at hand’ and 
‘there will be no clear consensus’, but also a ‘clear need to consider policy decisions 
before this uncertainty is resolved’ (Schneider and Mastrandrea, 2010, p. 17). From 
an ecophilosophical point of view this line of argument cannot be accepted because 
it implicitly suggests a ‘normal science’ that can be expected to resolve uncertainty 
about the future before policy decisions need to be considered. Th e ecophilosophical 
tradition has always been sceptical about the belief that science and experts can 
produce all the necessary information needed in order to make decisions without 
uncertainty, arguing instead that generalists are normally better suited to the making 
of sound judgements in real world situations. Th e complete individual is not a 
specialist; s/he is a generalist and an amateur, according to (Næss, 2005). From this 
perspective, global warming is not ‘post-normal’ but, rather, normal. Most gener-
alists and amateurs would recognise situations of interaction with nature where 
decisions must be made without certainty about the future: the fi sherman would 
like to know what the weather will look like the next morning before setting sail; 
peasants have always tried to interpret signs in nature before making decisions about 
when to sow. Instead of mystifying science by employing expressions like ‘post-
normal’, global warming instead asks us to reconsider the role of science. Science 
cannot be expected to produce certainty, but it can help to guide us to make more or 
less sound ethical judgements based on the uncertain predictions we have at the time 
when we need to make ‘policy decisions’. Th is understanding of the role of science 
would accept that we have no guarantee that the future will resemble the past, while 
also accepting that some statements on global warming are less fallible than others.
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NOTES
1.  I’m not convinced that critical realism should be seen as an ‘underlabourer’ of science, 
meaning that following critical realism will ensure better or correct results. However, 
for the purpose of this essay, I will not discuss this further, as I accept Bhaskar’s distinc-
tion between the realms of the empirical, actual and real, as minimal requirements.
2.  Empiricism conceives the world as a series of atomistic events, and causal laws a 
constant conjunction of events, but from a critical realist perspective, causal laws are 
not constant conjunctions of events.
3.  I use ‘experience’ here (even though I am aware of the problems of such a use) to 
capture a particular element of the process whereby proposed theories get accepted 
as ‘true’, not because we (the vast majority of us) understand or accept the natural or 
social laws proposed to explain the generative mechanisms and how they work on the 
phenomena observed, but because we feel or believe that they have proved themselves 
to ‘work’ in daily life. Newton’s prediction of a gravitational force demonstrates the 
problems with such a defi nition of ‘experience’. Many would say that the predicted 
force (gravity) must be there since they experience it every day. Still, it was the same 
type of experience-based argument that ensured that the Ptolemaic worldview persisted 
from ancient Greece until the time of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo.
4.  ‘Possibilism’ for Næss is ‘the assumption that the future is in principle completely open, 
off ering unimaginable surprises’ (A. Næss and Haukeland, 2002, p. 4). Th is assumption is 
closely related to Pyrrhonic scepticism that holds that no certain knowledge is possible.
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